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The article consists of a literature review on com-
prehensive approach guided by five dimensions 
from a conceptual focus to the application of com-
prehensive approach. This includes an examination 
of concepts, security challenges, impact, EU inter-
national level of ambition and implementation by 
Member States. With this purpose, the study aims 
at first, to examine the conceptual boundaries of 
comprehensive approach by considering in litera-
ture how researchers select particular effects of 
comprehensiveness to define the concept. Second, 
to analyze the security challenges inherent to com-
prehensive approach. Third, to examine how com-
prehensive approach is part of the EU transforma-
tive project needed to tackle crisis comprehensively. 
Fourth, to assess how the definition of level of 
ambition determines a more comprehensive role 
for the EU. Fifth, reviews the literature on the 
implementation processes of comprehensive 
approach from the perspective of national agencies 
and agents of selected EU Member States.
Resumo
Abordagem Abrangente na Gestão de Crises: Uma 
Revisão de Literatura
Este artigo consiste numa revisão da literatura sobre 
abordagem abrangente orientada por cinco dimensões 
compreendendo desde as questões conceptuais às práti-
cas de abordagem abrangente incluindo: conceitos, desa-
fios à segurança, impacto deste método de intervenção, 
nível de ambição e modalidades de implementação. Com 
este propósito, o presente estudo visa os seguintes objeti-
vos. Em primeiro lugar examina os seus limites concep-
tuais na literatura, ponderando como é que são analisa-
dos vários efeitos particulares de abordagem abrangente. 
Em segundo, analisa os desafios da segurança interna-
cional em contextos de abordagem abrangente. Em ter-
ceiro, debate em que medida a abordagem abrangente é 
parte integrante do papel transformativo da UE, no qua-
dro da gestão de crises. Em quarto, avalia como é que a 
definição de um dado nível de ambição por parte da UE 
pode determinar um papel internacional e mais abran-
gente por parte da União. Por último, revê a literatura e 
aborda como é que as agências e agentes nacionais de um 
grupo de Estados-membros da União se adaptam aos 
requisitos da abordagem abrangente e a implementam.
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Comprehensive Approach in Crisis Management: A Literature Review
Introduction
Comprehensive approach presents analytical challenges that pertain from concep-
tual and empirical perspectives, due to the lack of analytical consensus and distinct 
institutional and processual adaptation of actors, which may further or hamper its 
practical implementation. Additionally, comprehensive approach generates a high 
degree of expectation regarding problem solving, when its goal is focused on 
problem addressing, which leaves it susceptible to criticism. Its successful imple-
mentation is not a simple task, given comprehensiveness involves very diverse per-
ceptions, interests, instruments and policies. Various situations affect comprehen-
sive approach. First, the presence of limited political will or selective political 
solidarity to engage in situations of crisis management and conflict resolution, as 
well as the narrow effort made by regional local actors to assume the responsibi- 
lities that come with ownership, do impact on an efficient comprehensiveness. 
Second, the systemic effects of current threats and risks, affect differently actors in 
the international system1 and their willingness and capacity to allocate the required 
resources necessary to prevent, mitigate, manage and contain instability. Third, a 
growing number of state and non-state actors, that intervene in crisis management, 
conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, add complexity to comprehen-
siveness given they held different goals, institutional cultures, resources and dis-
tinct security practices. Despite the fact that a wide variety of stakeholders present 
in complex crisis situations may contribute to enhance representativeness of inter-
ests and increase the number of the resources available, it may also pose challenges 
to internal coordination and external cooperation. Finally, the presence of systemic 
threats and risks in current international affairs, also calls for a broader approach to 
crisis prevention, management and resolution, which comprehensive approach 
and action may help to achieve.
The present study has five aims2. First, to examine the conceptual boundaries of 
comprehensive approach in literature. Second, to analyze the security challenges 
that may affect comprehensive approach. Third to examine how comprehensive 
approach is part of the EU transformative role needed to tackle crisis comprehen-
sively. Fourth to assess how the definition of level of ambition may determine a 
more comprehensive role for the EU. Fifth, addresses how two distinct categories of 
Member States adapt to implementation of comprehensive approach. 
1 In the context of this research by actors, one refers to the stakeholders such as the Euro- 
pean Union, international and national institutions, civilian (comprehending personnel from 
various sectors and fields of expertise), police and military personnel that have a role in imple-
menting comprehensive approach in crisis management and conflict resolution.
2 Issues related to assessment and planning of comprehensive approach actions at the opera-
tional level will not be dealt with in the context of this study. 
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Conceptualizations of Comprehensive Approach
Conceptualization results in an attempt to organize a given part of reality, by identi-
fying the nature and scope of a specific phenomenon. Comprehensive approach is 
used by many in different ways, in terms of the ‘priorities, means and end-states’ 
(Goor and Major, 2012, p. 2) identified. Its conceptual boundaries are as complex as 
its empirical practice. In the framework of this study, comprehensive approach per-
tains to how state and non-state actors coordinate and cooperate in order to prevent, 
manage and solve the root causes and the consequences of instability and insecurity, 
by finding ways to work in an integrated manner3, combining instruments leading 
to sustainability of security, stability, reconstruction and development4. This inter-
pretation draws attention to the multidimensional nature of the concept of compre-
hensive approach and its practice. Our understanding of comprehensive approach 
regards the implementation of sustainable approaches before, during and after crisis 
occur and it is related with preventive and reactive practices and methods of internal 
coordination, within state and non-state actors and external cooperation with exter-
nal partners. Comprehensive approach is as much as a product of exogenous com-
plex factors, related to the contemporary nature of threats and risks, as a process of 
internal and external adaptation to challenges by governmental agencies and secu-
rity organizations. As Pirozzi (2013, p. 7) sustains, comprehensive approach “can be 
considered as the policy response to the evolution of the concept of security beyond 
the conventional, state-centric and militarizes terms of the bipolar era”. Whether we 
consider it from the analytical or empirical point of view, comprehensive approach 
occurs beyond the traditional boundaries of the security dilemma among state 
actors, striving for military strategic advantage and favourable to the use of force. 
Additionally, comprehensive approach can be perceived as an inclusive process of 
3 In the United Kingdom and in a comprehensive approach context , the expression ‘integrated’ 
“refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military 
institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims and it concerns a 
situation where no one in one government department has a monopoly over responses to the 
challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts” (International Security Information Service, 
2014, ft.1, p. 4).
4 The notion of ‘comprehensive action’ is originally sourced in the United Nations (UN) model, 
design to improve coordination among UN departments’ instruments under the designation 
of ‘Integrated Missions’. It is part of UN planning of multi-dimensional peacekeeping opera-
tions. It blends the security dimension with those of development, human rights, gender and 
humanitarian aid, in transitional phases from conflict to sustainable peace. In this context, 
the UN adopts what is designated as Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) in order to 
facilitate the implementation of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. IMPP is seen as a 
“dynamic continuous process allowing for activities and objectives to be revised, as the mis-
sion’s understanding of its operational environment grows and as that environment itself 
changes” (United Nations, 2008, p. 56). 
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cooperation by systematizing “processes and mechanisms, promoting continuous 
interaction and exchange between often segregated policy communities” (Merket, 
2016, p. 22) from the security environments.
In 2014, the EU Council Conclusions (2014a, § 2) acknowledge comprehensive 
approach both as “a working method and a set of concrete measures and processes 
to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its 
broad array of existing tools and instruments, could collectively develop, embed 
and deliver more coherent policies, implement more efficient working practices 
and achieve better results”. In 2016, the High Representative at the occasion of the 
European Council held on the 28th and 29th of June presented the new EU Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (High Representative, 
2016), stressing the evidence that “the meaning and scope of comprehensive 
approach will be expanded underlining the need for the EU to act before, during 
and after crisis and conflicts unfold”5.
From an academic perspective, comprehensive approach offers a new analytical 
dimension regarding the EU external action and crisis management, offering new 
ground for research by providing a view on “new concepts and policies for a more 
coordinated approach to crisis management” (Gross, 2008, p. 9). At the empirical 
level, it provides a field of observation of new forms of securitization, calling atten-
tion to the benefits of preventing and reacting to insecurity, with the help of broader 
security options throughout the whole cycle of crisis and conflicts, at diverse levels 
and with the contribution of different policy dimensions. The current complexity 
and volatility of the international security landscape, in the domain of crisis and 
conflicts poses additional difficulties when one seeks to draw very precise and 
5 The document offers two, among many other, aspects of interest to this study. The first pertains 
to the title given to the new EU global strategy, by stressing the aspects of ‘shared vision, common 
action: a stronger Europe’ and only in the subtitle referring to ‘A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (italics added by the author). The second, the fact the 
expression ‘comprehensive approach’, widely used in the Joint Communique presented by the 
Commission/HR in 2013 (see High Representative/European Commission, 2013). On the Euro-
pean Council Conclusions of 2014 on the EU’s comprehensive approach see (Council of the 
European Union, 2014) and on the Action Plan on the implementation of comprehensive 
approach presented in 2015 by the European Commission see (European Commission, 2015a). 
Comprehensive approach is often replaced, throughout the 2016 document, by the expression of 
‘integrated approach’ commonly used by Member States such as the France, The Netherlands 
and Denmark in their national policy documents (see further ahead in this article on the section 
of ‘EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review’). It is important 
to recall that both the European Council that closed the Dutch EU Presidency and the presenta-
tion of the High Representative document to the Council were disturbed by the result of Brit-
ain’s referendum. Only the close team that worked with the High Representative may explain 
whether that influenced the final text issued by the HR, but it is pertinent to raise the question.
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all-inclusive definitions of the interactions required to stabilize crises and conflicts, 
mitigate future root causes of instability and create conditions for sustainable secu-
rity, peace and development. The growing complexity of international crisis, due to 
the contemporary nature of security, leads to the fact comprehensive approach is on 
demand and is a widely used method of external action, although requiring better 
coordination and wider cooperation. 
Literature on comprehensive approach often reflects a unidimensional approach, 
which probably results more from the difficulty to capture all the features that 
characterizes current security governance6. The complexity of security environ-
ments and the growing level of interdependence among security actors, lead 
researchers to look for ‘specific aspects of comprehensiveness’ (Gebhard and 
Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224) by selecting particular effects of comprehensive-
ness. Literature on comprehensive approach reflects to some extent this unidimen-
sional approach, which probably results from the complexity of implementing it 
and from the diversity of actors involved, leading researchers to narrow down their 
object of study and privilege a single dimension.
Literature on comprehensive approach regards three traditional levels of analysis. 
The first looks into ‘whole-of-government approaches’ related to the interaction 
between the traditional field of foreign policy, with those of justice, police, develop-
ment aid, disaster relief and humanitarian action at the international level. A sec-
ond body of literature concerns ‘intra-agency’ within institutions, regarding hori-
zontal coordination with respect to processes of comprehensiveness, namely those 
related with how institutions enable comprehensive approach and how compre-
hensive approach may lead to institutional reform. A third group of contributes 
values ‘interagency’ pertaining to cooperation processes of comprehensiveness 
between institutions, notably governmental departments (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, 
p. 9; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224; Friis and Jarmyr, 2008, p. 4). 
In this study, the literature review conducted on comprehensive approach allows to 
identify four possible levels of research: security governance; institutionalization 
and institutional change; cooperation-coordination and enhanced civil-military 
relations.
Security Governance
The first dimension of comprehensive action comprises network governance 
approaches, as dealt with in literature about security governance, contributing to 
6 To Smith (2013, p. 33) “new forms of security governance result from learning processes origi-
nated in how well new procedures and new institutional roles help solving security problems” 
and “new procedures and institutional roles result from adaptation processes, which translate 
into new responsibilities (conceptions of place in the world), rules (institutional rules and orga-
nizational structures) and resources (material and non-material assets)” (Idem, pp. 36-37).
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understand how actors coordinate and cooperate within and between organiza-
tions, irrespective of traditional power and government centred relations. In this 
case, comprehensive security governance, as Krahmann (2003, p. 11) observes 
“denotes the structures and processes which enable access of public and private 
actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making 
and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central (sole) 
political authority”7. This body of literature focuses on how changes in the secu-
rity environment lead to a shift from state centric actorness in international 
problem solving, to a situation where both governmental and non-governmental 
actors take a role, being that many of the actors that take part in decision-making 
are located above the state level. Security governance consists of a system of regu-
lation of security “relations at the regional or international level set aside govern-
ments” (Kirchener, 2006, p. 949) established by “political actors other than 
governments” (Webber et al., 2004, p. 5). Within a security regime, decision-mak-
ing is ‘horizontally dispersed’ (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13) (as in comprehensive coor-
dination) in the absence of an ‘overarching governmental authority’ (Webber et 
al., 2004, p. 5) and policy implementation is decentralised, self-enforced, being 
actor’s ‘compliance of a voluntary nature’ (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13; Nunes, 2011, 
pp. 60-63)8. In the EU comprehensive action, one can identify distinct forms of 
comprehensive governance pertaining to different forms of strategic action. This 
occurs among the EU main decision-making bodies at various levels of gover-
nance, both in its intergovernmental level with respect to crisis management 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP – and Common Security and 
Defence Policy – CSDP) and its supranational dimensions regarding the do- 
mains of development aid, civil protection, disaster relief and humanitarian assis-
tance. Woollard (2013) introduces a distinction between a broad and narrow 
understanding of comprehensive action9. The first, regards the integrated “EU 
approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of coun-
7 Text in brackets added by the author.
8 In a EU context, although Member States retain a great number of competences and financial 
and material resources to implement security and defense policies, the EU through CSDP 
comprises common institutions and processes that ‘guide and restrain... (common) action’ 
(Keohane, 2002, p. 15) and facilitate common action that otherwise could not be put into prac-
tice, leading to comprehensive approach.
9 This divide between the intergovernamental and supranational decision-making is also identi-
fied by Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011, pp. 231-232) as responsible for introducing a 
logic that may affect interaction and cooperation, being considered as one of two situations. It 
may create tensions between structural and operational elements of security or it may cause 
tensions between the internal and external dimensions of security.
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tries” (Idem, p. 1). In this case, integrated means general acceptance by “all rele-
vant EU institutions and policies, ‘tools’ and activities to implement these objec-
tives” (Idem, ibidem). In a EU context broad comprehensive action is opera- 
tionalized through thematic or regional strategies and narrow comprehensive 
approach applies to the action plans that result from them. A narrow expression 
may also consubstantiate an interpretation of comprehensive approach drawing 
on the possibility of civil-military integration within military and civilian CSDP 
actors (Idem, ibidem). Limiting comprehensive approach to crisis management, 
thus restraining it to the area of competences of the EEAS, contradicts the nature 
and scope of the concept itself, which in our understanding regards all relevant 
actors, that take part with different policies and instruments, in different stages of 
external action in order to prevent, manage and solve security problems, being 
security regarded in a broad sense.
Other views on security governance convey a perspective which value the condi-
tions of institutional ‘inclusiveness and horizontal coherence’ (Schroeder, 2011, 
p. 50). Schroeder observes that, inclusiveness occurs when inter-organizational 
coordination comprehends all “relevant actors in devising coordinated answers 
to a complex security challenge” regardless institutional affiliation. Horizontal 
coherence takes place when actors share horizontal coordination provisions, work-
ing “towards enhancing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a specific cross-
cutting goal” (Idem, ibidem). The same author argues that security governance 
allows to evaluate comprehensiveness strength in four parameters: “durability 
(stability of interactions over time), intensity (frequency of interactions), level 
(formal and informal coordination venues) and membership of inter-organizatio- 
nal coordination (number, profession and policy arena of involved actors)” (Idem, 
pp. 50-51). Studies with a more applied outlook highlight the importance of com-
prehensiveness to the internal domain played by the horizontal dimension (ade-
quate level of internal security in complex environments involving law-enforce-
ment, border management, judicial cooperation, civil protection, political, economic, 
financial, social and private sectors); and the vertical dimension of security, com-
prising international cooperation, EU security policies, regional cooperation 
between Member States and Member States’ own policies at those levels (FOCUS, 
2011, p. 7). 
Institutionalization and Institutional Adaption 
On what concerns institutional adaptation, perspectives in literature consider the 
process of institutionalization of comprehensive approach in three different ways. 
Some look at institutional adaption from the point of view of external efficiency 
and impact of the EU, as a way to enhance external coherence and comprehensive-
ness of the Union’s policies. Others view institutional adaptation, for instance the 
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review of the EEAS10, as a consequence that enables a more effective comprehensive 
approach. A third group of authors take a closer look into how new capabilities and 
other resources may enhance the visibility of the Union as an external actor, thus 
enabling better comprehensiveness.
The dimension that assesses efficiency and impact understands comprehensive 
approach as the result of integrated action, caused by processes of institutional 
adaptation among ‘centralized institutions’, vital to the implementation of compre-
hensive approach. This regards the levels of ‘strategic and operational planning’ 
(Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 228) where different political actors, 
such as the High Representative, the President of the European Council, the Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee, EU 
Military Staff and the Commission (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 17) play a role in the 
decision-making structure. None of these EU bodies has centralized or overarching 
authority across all the EU policies, strategies and instruments. European security 
governance is shaped, conducted and limited by constitutive norms, centered on 
willing compliance (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42, Protocol 10), on the respect for 
Members States preferences, for their constitutional constraints and for the security 
and defense commitments agreed in the framework of other international organi-
zations (Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 28 and 42). 
As observed by Gebhard and Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 231) “Europe shares an 
external portfolio mainly constituted by its external trade policy, development 
cooperation and regional cooperation, as well as of loose intergovernmental coor-
dination within the European Political Cooperation”. This means that from an early 
stage, the EU benefited from a unique experience as an international actor, whose 
external action is characterized as having a comprehensive nature due to the scope 
of actors, policies and instruments involved. Although the European Community 
originally appeared as a regulatory, economic and social actor, soon it evolved into 
a normative, security and defense player, which led to a structural adaptation of the 
European Union on “how these new components of external action could be recon-
ciled with the structural instruments the Community, already had at its disposal” 
10 The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed 
in 2007, which entered into force in 2009. The EEAS was meant to strengthen the European 
Union on the global stage and to ‘ensure consistency between the different areas of its external 
action and between those areas and its other policies’ (Council Decision, 2010/427/EU).. The 
EEAS was officially launched on January 1st 2011 and since then its structure was revised in 
October 2014 in order to improve the crisis management services and the Foreign Policy Instru-
ments Service. A draft review was presented in July 2015 in order to “streamline planning and 
decision making procedures related to CSDP missions and operations (…) in cooperation with 
Member States (…) guided by the November 2013 Council conclusions on CSDP and the 
December 2013 European Council Conclusions” (Council of the European Union, 2013,§ 3).
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(Idem, ibidem). The political divide that characterized the implementation of two 
different paths within Europe, one of intergovernmental nature, regarding the 
management of political affairs and another of supranational orientation, con- 
cerning economic and social matters, is consequential over the development of 
comprehensive approach by connecting the domains of foreign policy to those of 
trade, crisis management, development assistance and humanitarian aid.
The literature on institutional change regards institutional adaptation in a twofold 
manner: as a source and a consequence of implementation of comprehensive 
approach. As a source of comprehensiveness, the constitution of the EEAS helps 
streamlining and improving the decision making process, seeking to guarantee the 
consistency of the Union’s external action and generate better coordination between 
EU actors and cooperation among all relevant external partners. The EEAS can be 
understood as what the literature (Lehmann, 2011, p. 27) refers to as a ‘complex 
adaptive system’, which process of organization responds to external crisis with fur-
ther ‘centralization of decision-making authority’ thus concentrating power and 
‘more control’ in tackling crisis ‘between actors or between actors and their environ-
ment’ (Idem, pp. 30-32). This view of a complex adaptive system regards the process 
of adaptation of actors and decision-making processes when crises occur, causing 
disruption of the status quo of a given system as ‘existed before the crisis occurred’ 
(Idem, p. 29). It generates a centralization of power and resources on national execu-
tives (in the case of the EEAS on EU actors) and a ‘reduction of actors involved’ 
(Idem, p. 32) (in the EEAS case, materialized in a review and simplification of its 
structure) in order to better manage crisis and restore control and stability. 
Consequently, the discrete reviews of the EEAS11 since 2011, reflect a slow process 
of institutional adaptation of the EU’s external service towards comprehensiveness, 
in order to attain more effective policies and improve the global impact of the EU 
presence. This was materialized by the High Representative, with the agreement of 
the President of the European Commission, on the constitution of a Commission-
er’s Group on External Action aimed at “creating a more structural underpinning 
for the comprehensive approach with the aim of further enhancing strategic coher-
ence” (High Representative/European Commission, 2013; High Representative 
11 Since 2011, the EEAS has gone various institutional adaptations in 2014 and 2015 leading to a 
simplified structure with the creation of three Deputy Secretary Generals, responsible for Eco-
nomic and Global Issues, Political Affairs and CSDP and Crisis Response, to whom the Manag-
ing Directors of the EEAS geographical and thematic desks answer to. 
 In the future, an assessment of the competences of the High Representative may be desirable, 
due to the too broad scope of responsibilities as High Representative responsible for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy, as Vice President of the 
Commission, Foreign Minister of the Member States under the EU rotating Presidency and 
Head of the European Defense Agency (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Article 18.4).
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2015). Additionally the new Crisis Response System, within the EEAS, reflects the 
need for better internal coordination. The latest revision of the crisis management 
procedures meets this demand with the creation of a Crisis Management Board, 
connecting the horizontal aspects of EEAS crisis response functions, in liaison 
with Commission and Council General Secretariat, the chairman of EU Military 
Committee, the Chair of the Political and Security Committee, the geographical 
managing directorates and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security 
Policy and the Crisis Platform created to facilitate information share and provide 
political and strategic guidance for further action and planning. This last body 
meets on an ad hoc basis and is activated in response to a crisis. It includes the EEAS, 
the European Commission and Council Secretariat.
Comprehensive approach emerges as a central concept to the EEAS review process 
“which makes the EU distinctively able to tackle all aspects of a foreign policy issue” 
(EEAS, 2013, p. 3). The revision of the EEAS corresponds to a process of adaptation 
through institutional change, where the practice of comprehensive action requires 
the institutionalization of comprehensive approach within the EEAS, as a whole. 
Two categories of challenges have been shaping the developments of EU compre-
hensive approach. On the one hand, exogenous challenges pertaining to the proli- 
feration of non-state actors with long lasting destabilizing effects, leading to new 
crises in wider geographies following the ‘Arab Springs’ movement. On the other, 
endogenous problems, such as the financial crisis in the Eurozone and closer inter-
dependence between internal-external security threats led to an increased need for 
better ‘coordination and effectiveness in crisis response’, to ‘network and pool 
resources more efficiently’ (Ashton, 2014, p. 12) and ultimately to a ‘common, com-
prehensive and consistent EU global strategy’ (Mogherini, 2015, p. 3). Earlier, this 
concern with commonality, comprehensiveness and consistency led the former High 
Representative Ashton to focus the EEAS review proposal on “crisis prevention, 
mobilizing different strengths, capacities and working in partnership (as) the key 
principles underpinning policy in dealing with conflicts and crisis” (Ashton, 2014, 
p. 14). To the former High Representative, comprehensive approach is a process of 
“bringing together all of the different policies or instruments for a common purpose, 
which is to endeavor to tackle issues and problems before they evolve into a crisis 
(…) in order to be effective we need to join forces and pool resources – those of the 
External Action Service, the Commission and the EU Member States, complemented 
by strong partnerships across the world” (Idem, ibidem). This conceptualization of 
comprehensive approach, as defined at the highest institutional level of the EU 
external representation, stresses the importance of three dimensions: (1) the preven-
tive impact of comprehensive approach; (2) the need for complementary degrees of 
internal and external coordination and cooperation; (3) the coexistence of distinct 
policy levels operating jointly within the European decision making structure. 
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The third dimension of institutional adaptation present in the literature concerns 
how comprehensive approach may cause the development of new capabilities 
(Smith, 2013, pp. 36-41). Smith recognizes comprehensive approach as a cumulative 
process of addition of new capabilities (e.g. military and police forces) connecting 
defense and security domains to the existing EU civilian/foreign and economic 
policy tools, in order to improve the EU’s effectiveness and coherence as a global 
actor. EU’s comprehensiveness means a special focus on ‘preventive action’ by 
making use of ‘EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem’ (Idem, 
p. 37) and results from a combination between EU policing/military capabilities 
and ‘longstanding expertise’ (Idem, p. 38). This definition, although illustrative of 
the empirical application of the concept, appears at odds with the concept itself, 
due to the fact comprehensive approach may occur before, during and after a crisis, 
thus requiring a condition of sustainability, aiming at not only one security target, 
but multiple ones, with a multidimensional scope. 
To Smith (2013, p. 33) adaption to new security conditions result from learning 
processes originated in how successfully new procedures and new institutional 
roles help solving security problems. The same author observes that “comprehen-
sive approach is not just about improving functionality; it has also much to do 
with the EU’s conception of itself as a responsible global actor’, being perceived 
as an ‘EU trademark in international politics’” (Smith, 2013, p. 40). The set-up 
of new institutional roles, instruments and procedures among the EU institu- 
tions and Member States result from various adaptation processes. First from 
new roles that come with newly perceived responsibilities related with the concep-
tions of place an actor has in the world. Second, from the adoption of new 
rules (institutional rules and formal organizational setting). Third, from the adap-
tation of the resources employed in long term stability, such as the role of civil 
society, the development of state building capabilities and the implementation 
of programmes of security sector reform (SSR) in combination with foreign 
and economic policy tools (Smith, 2013, p. 33 and pp. 36-37) made available by 
the EU. In fact, Gross (2008, pp. 14-15) considers SSR not only as a key concept to 
improve governance in post-conflict situations, but also as one of the most fre-
quent indicators of civilian-military cooperation, especially when in articulation 
with processes leading to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). 
The geographical and thematic strategies adopted by the EU, namely those for 
the Horn of Africa, Sahel and Gulf of Guinea are outlined around the principle 
of perceived responsibilities of ‘support for welfare of the people of Horn of 
Africa’, tackle ‘the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards creating the 
grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development’ in the 
case of the Sahel region and ‘helping states to strengthen their maritime capabili-
ties, the rule of law and effective governance across the region’ in the case of Gulf 
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of Guinea12. These strategies, which result from a new comprehensive approach to 
security are being supported in their implementation by strengthening regional 
cooperation with relevant actors, by enhancing capacity building and by using the 
financial support of programmes sourced in the EU and in relevant international 
and regional organizations.
Coordination and Cooperation
On the fourth dimension of the literature review conducted, one identifies that the 
adaptation processes that have comprehensive approach as a goal, pose analytical 
and empirical challenges to internal/external coordination within the EEAS, per-
taining to the need and will to have a higher degree of influence concentrated at the 
High Representative level – as compared to other EU actors like the European 
Commission and Council – with consequences over the competences balance 
among EU actors and the incentives to generate political will by Member States13. 
As Duke (2014, p. 30) points out, coordination not only requires a better definition 
of the role and mission of the EEAS, but also willingness of Member States to incor-
porate decisions at the EU level, in the face of limited consensus, which may 
hamper the EEAS ability ‘to shape external actions’ and effectively implement com-
prehensive approach and action. The latest EEAS review proposal relates effective-
ness in the implementation of comprehensive approach, with improvements in 
coordination and impact on future institutionalization of cooperation. This applies 
to distinct EU actors namely the EU delegations and the EU Special Representatives 
and external partners, whether one refers to third countries or other international 
organizations (EEAS, 2013, p. 5).
The processes of internal coordination and external cooperation leading to com- 
prehensive action are suggested in literature through two interpretations. On the 
one hand, that of authors focused on the coordination challenges posed by the 
increasing internal-external nexus in security relations (Eriksson and Rhinard, 
2009)14 and that examine the challenges leading to better engagement and policy 
12 See Council of the European Union 2014/ 7671; Council of the European Union 2011/ 16858; 
European Union External Action Service, 2011.
13 The Review document was careful on the preservation of the Commission’s competences in the 
current architecture; its role was even reinforced with the addition within the EEAS of the 
Commission’s service of the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) responsible for the implementa-
tion of specific budgets such as the Instrument for Stability and Foreign Policy regulatory 
instruments. On the draft version of the future EEAS structure (dated 24 July 2015) the FPI is 
preserved and positioned on the upper part of the EEAS structure, together with the EU Mili-
tary Committee. 
14 The report issued by the HR ahead of the June 2015 European Council also stressed the impor-
tance of developing synergies between the area of Freedom/Security/Justice affairs and CSDP, 
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coordination among actors. On the other, authors that perceive the political divides 
or competences ‘boundary disputes’ (Blockmans and Nbauer, 2013; Major and 
Mölling, 2013; Merket, 2013) as a major source of disengagement from better coor-
dination practices. At the EU level, these disputes between decision-making levels 
and policy actors are particularly evident in the case of foreign policy, development 
aid and humanitarian action.
In the context of literature concerned with coordination and cooperation, the EU 
comprehensive approach results from the presence of several conditions (FOCUS, 
p. 7). First, at the internal level, the EU comprehensive approach results from a will 
to improve the Union’s strategic approach to the EU external action.15 Second, a 
growing involvement in crisis management leads to develop partnerships and con-
sequently to more frequent cooperative practices between the EU and different 
institutions and actors. Third, the construction of a ‘shared strategic vision’ and 
better cooperation between civil-military actors and EU institutions are essential 
conditions for comprehensive approach to happen. This view emphasizes the value 
of a European common approach to crisis and the role of coordination among EU 
institutions, complementarity of EU policies (CSDP, development assistance and 
humanitarian aid) and cooperation with external actors. Tardy’s (2015, p. 32 and 
pp. 36-37) contribution to the understanding of comprehensive approach leads to 
reexamine the debate about EU actorness and further reflects on the possibility of 
an objective impact assessment of the EU external action which Gebhard and 
Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 226) refer to as “EU’s (specific) qualities and perfor-
mance as a comprehensive security actor”16. 
At the conceptual level, comprehensive approach refers to harmonization of prin-
ciples and better outline of integrated and complementary action in complex crisis. 
At the practice level, it highlights the complexity of engaging various sectoral 
approaches in crisis management, it combines different organizational cultures and 
involves the use of distinct instruments from individual actors at different stages, 
throughout the crisis cycle. As Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011) observe, at 
the EU level, this poses a challenge due to its ‘complex multilevel structures’, which 
involve a “large number of institutional actors and policies that need to be coordi-
nated across bureaucratic, organizational and functional boundaries” (Gebhard 
notably in the framework of the European Union Internal Security Strategy adopted in 2014 and 
The European Agenda on Security agreed in May 2015 (High Representative, 2015, pp. 5-6).
15 Regarding the notion of strategic approach, we share Biscop (2015, p. 8) perspective that the 
EU strategic approach is place beyond the simple act of ‘reacting to things’; is ‘not about 
everything’; it is not a ‘compilation’ or ‘replacement’ of Member States’ foreign policies, but 
rather a complement to it and it should regard the EU best comparative advantage when com-
pared to other security organizations (Nunes, 2010, p. 64).
16 Brackets added by the author.
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and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 222). Consequentially, the EU is ‘virtually meant 
to act comprehensively’ (Idem, ibidem) appealing to its founding myths as a 
civilian, normative and ethical power in the domain of security17. Comprehensive 
approach may be considered as an incremental process of coordination. It gets more 
effective, as organizations improve their own internal practices of coordination; as 
actors are willing to attain or strengthen the habit to cooperate with others and 
Member States perceive that their preferences and interests resonate among the 
international organizations they integrate.
Comprehensive approach holds a set of defining principles that inform the defini-
tional boundaries of the internal-external relation18. It implies ‘collective ownership 
and responsibility’ (Civil Society, 2013, p. 2), meaning that no single actor ‘can 
claim’ full property of the instruments and processes involved in comprehensive 
approach, but also that ownership presupposes consensual agreement on actors 
and actions to be pursued. Also due to the diverse universe of actors, comprehen-
sive approach suggests ‘obligation of transparency’ (Idem), which requires better 
practices of ‘information sharing’, internal ‘coordination’ and external cooperation 
among likeminded actors and organizations. Action is, according to the same 
source, context oriented not ‘instrument driven’, a principle of action which is 
difficult to trace in complex crisis, where actors and interests representatives are 
multiple, thus enabling the prevalence of different preferences. Finally, it claims 
observation of ‘principles underpinning the different instruments’, actors and 
actions, as well as identification and evaluation of the advantages in the application 
of different instruments such as those in the field of foreign policy, military, police, 
humanitarian and development according to local requirements and needs. 
The scope of the concept of comprehensive approach must also be explained in the 
framework of the full span of crisis and conflict cycles. Some authors (Gebhard, 
2013, p. 2) consider this kind of “functional holism across the conflict cycle more of 
an idealist aspiration than an attainable goal”. As Goor and Major (2012, p. 1) note, 
comprehensive approach is about ‘sustainable conflict transformation’ aiming at 
preventing, managing, solving or stabilizing crisis and conflicts, developing 
sustainable institutions, governmental structures, democratically elected or with 
transitional representative functions, as well as encouraging social and economic 
development of societies and communities. At this level, comprehensive approach 
17 See Nunes (2011).
18 See Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting (2013). The Civil Society Dialogue Network is a 
mechanism design to promote dialogue between civil society and European policy-makers on 
matters related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union through the 
Instrument for Stability and by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, in co-operation 
with the European Commission and the European External Action Service.
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regards a mode of intervention jointly, side by side or in sequence in terms of actors 
and policy instruments (Binder et al., 1971; Pirozzi, 2013, pp. 11-13). 
Currently, there is no full explanatory theory of crisis, for which it is difficult to 
attempt to produce a general approach to comprehensive approach from the point 
of view of actors’ sequential intervention in crisis prevention, management and 
conflict resolution. State and non-state actors have different institutional cultures, 
competences and resources, which may shape the collaborative manner and the 
impact of the means employed in one stage of crisis, as compared to another. Not 
all actors have or make available a full array of instruments, whether by reasons of 
mandate, organizational and institutional designed or interest. However, this may 
determine how international organizations or state actors may work effectively 
jointly, side by side or in a sequential manner. Thus, the type of action underpin-
ning the concept of comprehensive approach may be affected by the institutional 
design of the international organizations involved and by Member States own 
security and institutional culture. The manner in which actors get involved in com-
prehensive approach, through cooperation and coordination, are also important as 
a definitional feature of it, as Drent (2011, pp. 8-9) and Hauck and Rocca (2014, 
p. 28) observed. This is a characteristic particularly noticeable in the humanitarian 
assistance field, level at which civil-military cooperation may occur during and 
after the crisis period has occurred. Comprehensive approach refers to the actions 
“undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner by national and multina-
tional civilian government agencies, military forces, international and intergovern-
mental organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as (by) the private 
sector in order to achieve greater harmonization in the planning, management, and 
evaluation of coalition interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies” 
(Multinational Experiment 5, 2009, p. 2). Effective coordination and coopera- 
tion may also function as a benchmark to assess positive impact among security 
providers and donors.
Civil-Military Coordination 
The fifth and last dimension of comprehensive approach identified in literature, 
and also the most traditional of all, regards civil-military coordination (CMCO) and 
concerns the intervention of distinct communities of experts in a simultaneous or 
sequential manner in crisis management and post conflict stabilization, that is 
when civilian missions (e.g. police mission) are combined or succeed a military 
operation. As observed by Gross (2008, p. 11), CMCO refers to a new ‘culture of 
coordination’ and a ‘prerequisite for the elaboration of an effective crisis response’ 
blending ‘continued co-operation’, ‘shared political objectives’, ‘well defined tasks 
for EU actors’ and ‘synchronization of activities in theatre’. This approach resem-
bles what may be branded as a strategic approach to cooperation, not in the sense 
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of an approach adopted to meet opposing wills, but rather a far-reaching perspec-
tive meant to safeguard common objectives through task division and synchro-
nized or sequential action. Improvements on better civil-military cooperation19 
increased after 2002, at a time when the EU was looking for both an internal strate-
gic consensus, surrounding the drafting of the European Security Strategy and 
better cooperation in terms of external relations with strategic partnerships with 
other security organizations, namely NATO20 and UN21. In both cases, institutional 
adaptation and institutionalization of cooperation occurred, facilitating a more 
comprehensive approach to civilian-military affairs. These initiatives led to the for-
malization of closer contact at the highest echelons of the EU and NATO structure, 
namely between the EU High Representative and NATO and the UN respective 
Secretary-Generals; between the EU Political and Security Committee and NATO 
North Atlantic Council and UN Deputy Secretary-General; between EU-NATO 
Military Committees and International Staffs; between the EU Council Secretariat 
and the Commission services and the UN Secretariat and also in capabilities 
development through the NATO-EU Capability Group. The EU and NATO, since 
then, have been developing closer cooperation in crisis management, capability 
development (e.g. combat on terrorism, maritime, piracy, cyber-security and orga-
nized crime) and political consultations22 reflecting the notion that a growing frag-
mentation of external threats pressed for the formalization of comprehensive 
modalities of cooperation.
19 The development of comprehensive approach dates back to crisis management in the context of 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in central Europe with the crisis in Central 
Europe, namely in Bosnia. The EU civil-military involvement in Bosnia at a time when a military 
EU-led operation broadly (EUFOR Althea between December 2004-November 2014 ) coexisted 
for a period of time with a civilian police mission (EUPM between January 2003 to June 2012)
20 The agreement on better EU-NATO cooperation was celebrated under the comprehensive 
framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, concluded in March 2003, preceded by the 
conclusions of NATO’s Washington Summit (1999), the European Council in Nice (December 
2000) and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (December 2002). This agreement would enable the 
EU access to NATO planning, command options and the use of NATO capabilities. See also 
European Commission 2003/526 final and European Commission 2001/231 final.
21 In June 2002 the EU-UN Declaration on co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment, underlined the commitment of the EU to contribute to the United Nations efforts in 
conflict prevention and crisis management and the Swedish Presidency of 2001 took forward 
the mandate to identify ‘areas and modalities for co-operation with the UN in crisis mana- 
gement’ namely in the context of civilian and military aspects of crisis management in the 
Western Balkans, Middle East, Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and West Africa.
22 A closer civil-military cooperation implied a process of institutional adaptation at the political-
strategic echelons of both organizations, among groups of experts EU and NATO Military 
Committees, between the European Defense Agency and NATO’s Allied Command Transfor-
mation and between NATO and EU’s Situation Centres, among others arrangements.
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In June 2015, the EU-UN common priorities expressed at the 70th United Nations 
General Assembly (September 2015-2016) underlined a cross sectoral, cross-policy 
approach stressing the commitment towards effective multilateralism; common 
participation in peace and security reviews; comprehensive review on non-proli- 
feration and disarmament; cooperation regarding counter terrorism; climate 
change; humanitarian rights and international law; protection of humanitarian 
space; gender issues and open, free and secure cyberspace23. The partnership 
EU-UN is still considered a good case of cooperative success, when compared with 
the cooperative relation developed between the EU and NATO. Despite the institu-
tionalization of cooperative relations between the EU and NATO, this is less visible 
for internal and external reasons, which impair joint comprehensive approach 
for two reasons. From the internal point of view, due to the position of some 
Alliance members that held this cooperative process hostage of their own national 
interests24. From the external point of view, due to the fact local actors have often 
been using competition between organizations and disagreements among Member 
States in order to maximize benefits (Michel, 2013, p. 263). This was particular evi-
dent during AMISOM, where NATO and the EU where engage separately, rather 
than jointly, in the support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aiming at 
ending violence and improve the humanitarian conditions in the field.
To sum up comprehensive approach is both a concept and a practice that pertains to 
adaptation of international actors to the changing international environment. It deals 
with causes and consequences of crisis and conflicts and seeks a durable rehabilita-
tion of local actors, decision-making structures and administrations vital to the secu-
rity and development of states and communities, in complex security environments.
Comprehensive approach encompasses different actors and levels of action com-
prising civilian and military actors, state-centric and non-state centric actors, 
governmental and non-governmental actors working at various stages, for instance 
that of security, development and humanitarian action or those of justice, social and 
economic levels, both in hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures.
Challenges Inherent to Comprehensive Approach 
The implementation of comprehensive approach faces institutional and procedural 
challenges conditioned by the diversity of political, strategical, societal and human-
itarian players25. If the international security of post-Cold War offers an exogenous 
23 Available at http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16584_en.htm.
24 The position of Turkey regarding the EU and Cyprus and of Greece towards Macedonia has led 
to a less effective EU-NATO cooperation as desired. 
25 In the EU structure, three levels of decision making intervene in crisis management. There is a 
first level of intergovernmental nature, pertaining to CSDP and Common Foreign Security 
Policy instruments. A second one of supranational nature, with respect to the European Com-
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challenge to the implementation of comprehensive approach, because international 
risks and threats are more complex and fragmented, the internal process of Euro- 
peanisation of CSDP appears to press for the development of new methodologies 
and instruments of comprehensive approach that followed institutional adaptation 
within CSDP. The European level emerges as the best ‘framework for the elabora-
tion of security policy’ (Webber et al., 2004, p. 14) complemented with thematic and 
geographical strategies. If the first (European level of decision-making), enables 
internal coordination essential to comprehensive approach. The second (thematic 
and geographical strategies), provides the topical and geographical focus that 
guide policies and helps defining the scenarios for European comprehensive action. 
The internal procedural diversity of the Union raises practical questions related to 
the implementation of CSDP and comprehensive approach due to the fact the 
nature and structure of European security offers to Member States a choice to par-
ticipate on the basis of informal ‘loose cooperation’ (Howorth, 2007). This facilitates 
a more flexible process of institutionalization, coordination and cooperation within 
the EU, which encourages comprehensive thinking and action. Various authors 
perceive European security as a relational system characterized by collaborative 
practice described as complex multilateral and multinational coordination; high 
level of institutionalized cooperation (Smith, 2004; Bono, 2004) and coalescent 
Europeanization of Member States’ security policies (Radaelli, 2006; Börzel and 
Risse, 2000; Tonra, 2013). As Joenniemi (2007, p. 140) observes, in Europe “coopera-
tive engagement works as a normative goal” improving the habit of shared policy 
practices among Member States. Some authors perceive the lack of a specific juridi-
cal and regulative dimension of this cooperation as a highly effective setting for the 
comprehensive implementation of European security and defence (Pape, 2005; 
Mattern, 2005). To others, it is a challenge at the origin of severe setbacks in 
European policy formulation, capabilities generation and international actorness 
(Hyde-Price, 2004 and 2008; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005) that may affect European 
comprehensive approach and action. 
Another challenge facing the implementation of comprehensive approach regards 
the need to avoid Member States decision makers and respective bureaucracies to 
influence the contents of the mandate to launch missions and operations in order to 
preserve national interests, sometimes at odds with the attainment of a common 
approach to security challenges. Comprehensive approach is not deprived from 
mission’s role in external cooperation, humanitarian aid and development. A third level, 
regards specific intra-European competences that result from the EEAS responsibilities in 
crisis management; from the coordination practices between the EEAS and the Commission’s 
Foreign Policy Instruments integrated in it, and from the attempts to facilitate closer relations 
between the EEAS services at the political and strategic level and the EU Special Representa-
tives and EU delegations.
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self-help approach to cooperation among security and defense organizations and it 
may even offer the opportunity for agencies to strive for their corporate interests, 
which in itself may be a challenge to effective implementation of comprehensive-
ness. It may be affected by rivalry, competition and duplication within EU institu-
tions, between Member States interests and other actors, which adds complex chal-
lenges to the background against which comprehensive approach is operationa- 
lized and implemented. This has been increasingly difficult to contain given the 
complexity of the situations in which a comprehensive approach methodology is 
recommended. The EU mandates and thematic and regional strategies, which 
frame a comprehensive approach perspective, should be broader in scope, but also 
inclusive and flexible. This would facilitate consensus, encourage political will and 
generate the necessary resources in theatre, thus facilitating adaptation to unpre-
dictable developments, occurrences and contingencies in theatre. Comprehensive 
approach is about making better use of a wide spectrum of resources and combined 
instruments and practices that produce a complex network of interactions, which 
pose challenges to the national interest of Member States, to their security cultures 
and practices in complex crisis.
Additionally, the working methods within the EU may constitute a challenge to com-
prehensive approach. Right after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the agreement 
on EU procedures to generate capabilities, shows evidence of a propensity to build up 
capabilities, before outlining the goals, the strategies and the scenarios where they 
could be employed (Nunes, 2016 and 2010; Bono, 2004; Bailes, 2008). In recent years, 
this tendency seems to be gradually replaced by the introduction of better-structured 
approaches to coordination and cooperation, through the agreement on action plans, 
enhanced partnerships and ‘more for more’ developmental programs, which charac-
terize current EU regional and thematic strategies and partnerships. 
Procedures of coordination and cooperation in European comprehensive approach 
lead actors to work jointly, side by side or in sequence and to overcome the difficul-
ties of implementation of adequate sequential action is a challenge to sustainable 
crisis response. The EEAS and the European Commission are structured to safe-
guard subsequent phases of long-term stabilization, in particular through the For-
eign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Commis-
sions’ agencies for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), as well 
as Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) programs. All these are valuable 
assets that may help successful transition across different stages of crisis and con-
flicts among distinct actors26. The accomplishment of sustainable responses to cri-
26 To our knowledge, insufficient research has been developed on whether or not the impact of 
comprehensive approach is greater when there are well established formal cooperation rela-
tions between the actors, for instance if the crisis occurs in regional contexts where the Euro-
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sis, by states and organizations, do not depend exclusively on their capacity to gen-
erate the required resources, but from their ability to generate political will, reach 
consensus and be prepared to intervene in a comprehensive manner before, during 
and long after crisis occurred. In this context, the prior existence of formal relations 
among actors may help to implement comprehensive approach, facilitating the use 
of practices leading to better coordination, in consecutive stages of engagement by 
one or various actors in theatre. 
The success of comprehensive approach depends on the ability of the actors 
involved to guarantee a good degree of transition from prevention to development. 
First by creating the conditions for stabilization during transitional phases of crisis 
management or during and following conflict resolution. Second, by strengthening 
institutions and local actors in order to mitigate, in a structured manner, the sources 
of insecurity and violence. Third, by committing local authorities and other rele-
vant local actors to take ownership of the institutions, administrations, instruments 
and processes leading to security, stability and development. Fourth, by ensuring 
an efficient transition among EU instruments from CSDP missions and operations, 
to Commission programs and projects, working in parallel with Member States’ 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives, in the context of other international organiza-
tions, present in theatre (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 17). Diversity of actors and multiplicity of 
resources may improve comprehensiveness, complementarity, representativeness 
and legitimacy of comprehensive approach practices. By offering diverse coopera-
tive options, it may better meet the variety of security demands in theater, but it 
also may run the risk of inefficiency due to the divisions posed by different inter-
ests, institutional and collaborative practices in place.
The presence of various actors in theatre may affect comprehensiveness. The EU 
has to struggle with the tensions caused by the systemic influence projected by 
hegemon states at the international level27, by the regional impact of other organiza-
tions missions and operations in theatre28 and by the effects of Member States and 
local actors’ clashing interests and preferences29 at a given time, with considerable 
pean Neighbourhood Policy applies or if conversely, such formal relations do not necessarily 
determine the success of comprehensive approach initiatives.
27 As Koschut (2014, p. 355) notes in the end of the Cold War, the introduction of an ‘out of area’ 
security practice by NATO, beyond the traditional area of application of the Washington Treaty 
further impediments, disagreements and lack of coordination among transatlantic allies, that 
have different perceptions of risk and threat, distinct constitutional arrangements and various 
types views on force projection. These type of tensions generated among allied security com-
munities may add another constrain to the effectiveness of comprehensive approach. 
28 See Drent et al. (2015).
29 For further reading on the effects of global versus national and local spaces impact over secu-
rity conceptions and practices, see Aris and Wenger (2014).
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impact on threat perceptions. Although the experiences in the Balkans, Afgha- 
nistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria called the attention to the utility of a comprehensive 
approach, in prevention, post crisis and post conflict recovery, leading to the 
creation of provincial reconstructions teams in the case of Afghanistan30, compre-
hensive approach is not yet designed to help fighting sources of insurgency, violent 
radicalization and terrorism. Nevertheless, improvements are visible with respect 
to increasing resilience of states and societies with the introduction of the EU 
‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’ (2011), the ‘Strategy for Security and 
Development in the Sahel’ (2011), the ‘EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea’ (2014) 
and the establishment of action plans, such as the Sahel Regional Action Plan 
2015-2020, together with the setup of EU Trust Funds, an important financial instru-
ment that may contribute to improve sustainable comprehensiveness. So far, three 
large EU Trust Funds have been created: the ‘EU Bêkou Trust Fund for Central 
African Republic’ (July 2014), the ‘EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria’ (2014) and the 
‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa’ (2015) with the aim to improve the EU and 
its Member States capacity to ‘deliver more flexible, comprehensive and effective 
joint support in response to emergencies’ (Hauck et al., 2015)31. These aid instru-
ments may help improving funds allocation and monitorization and facilitate 
engagement of third parties, partner countries and other international and regional 
organizations in the funds management, as an integrant part of comprehensive 
approach. 
To the presence of different interests and to the complexity of regional crisis envi-
ronments, one must add the challenge posed by local ‘relevant’ players and regional 
actors in regional crisis, as well as the role local cultural, social or even religious 
actors and practices may play in comprehensive approach32. Still in the domain of 
the challenges facing comprehensive approach, ownership matters to a successful 
process of stabilization, reconstruction and development. The EU official discourse 
has been dedicating a growing interest to capacity building of local actors in order 
to ensure security by their own means. This implies the development of efforts to 
empower local ownership of political and judicial institutions, good governance, 
rule of law, boarder management, public health management and social and eco-
nomic development.
The challenges facing the implementation of comprehensive approach are not a 
European idiosyncrasy, but rather a commonality to most international actors com-
30 For a view that corroborates this one see Hauck and Rocca (2014, p. 18).
31 For a detailed analysis on the EU Trust Funds see Hauck et al. (2015).These funds are instru-
ments of external aid, guided to countries, regions and globally to help solving emergency 
situations or post-conflict crises.
32 See Tardy (2014).
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mitted to it. Among the current major challenges one may identify, first the com-
plexity of assuring successful transition across the various phases of crisis manage-
ment and conflict resolution, from prevention to development. Second, to effectively 
commit ownership to the processes of local capacity building. Third, to comple-
ment simultaneously or in sequence, all the EU instruments from CSDP, to develop-
ment aid and humanitarian relief. Fourth, to accomplish an adequate balance 
between diverse actors, with distinct collaborative practices present in theatre. 
Fifth, to guarantee the impartiality of representativeness and safeguard of interests 
in regional crisis, which would add legitimacy to comprehensive approach and 
action. Sixth, to assure that comprehensive approach brings together sustainable 
solutions by gathering instruments oriented to long-term action, as those of foreign 
policy and financial, development and humanitarian aid. 
Comprehensive Approach as Part of the EU Transformative Role
The definition of a given international level of ambition comprises a definitional 
approach, which affects both how actors identify and select what is relevant and 
prioritary. The EU security follows a holistic approach that combines the dimen-
sions of security with those of foreign policy, external relations, development, 
humanitarian aid and military action, where needed and possible, with those 
of preventive action, capacity building and rehabilitation of fragile states and 
societies. At the EU level, considering that the CSDP is neither an organization nor 
a defense structure, one must keep in mind that, as an intergovernmental policy it 
gathers Member States with different strategic cultures and preferences that con-
duct foreign, security and defense policy unilaterally and bilaterally, with the help 
of coalitions of the willing or in the framework of global and regional security orga-
nizations. Additionally, the EU and CSDP are not the only platforms through which 
Member States can project their common preferences and interests at the global and 
regional level, but just one of several. This means that, an EU’s comprehensive 
approach is and will be less affected by the so called ‘clear’ definition of level of 
ambition33 or by the presence of a traditional ‘strategic concept’, but rather by Mem-
ber States' perception of power and influence and how comprehensive approach 
will contribute to it. As Gebhard and Martissen (2011, p. 222) observe, security is as 
“much a matter of physical safety, political freedom and economic stability as of 
environment balance or sustainable development”. The contemporary strategic 
environment has changed the nature of strategic culture and the way traditional 
33 The Union’s international goals and ‘level of ambition’ have already been stated in the Euro-
pean Security Strategy (2003) and The Report on the Implementation (2008), which identify the 
threats and means to mitigate them and with the support of several policy, thematic and 
regional strategy documents.
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concepts of influence, power, force projection (e.g. use of military force and terri- 
torial conquest) and influence are perceived, being gradually replace by alterna- 
tive dimensions of influence projection and impact. At this level the EU can, through 
comprehensive approach, develop its competitive advantage among other secu- 
rity actors. The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria have proven 
repeatedly, that not all security problems require military solutions34 and that the 
impact of military power does not necessarily generate more stable and secured 
relations. 
Authors that are critic about the EU’s ambition to become a global actor (Hyde-
Price, 2004 and 2006) and to adopt comprehensive approach (Mattelaer, 2013) as an 
instrument of international actorness, are often confined to traditional archetypes 
on ‘security communities’ that recognize NATO and the United States as efficient 
international actors and the global and military scope of their reach, as assets that 
give them a strategic advantage over other security actors. Constructivists, such as 
Buzan and Wæver (2003), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), liberal institutionalists as 
March and Olsen (1998) and even English School proponents, such as Dunne and 
Wheeler (1999) have contributed to explain the EU external behavior as a transfor-
mative project, of which comprehensive approach is an important part. These 
authors underlined the value of ‘normative and cultural diffusion or influence’, 
identifiable in the EU strategies for the Sahel region, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa 
and Middle East, where implementation of comprehensive approach has been 
recently tested. 
Comprehensive approach gives the EU the possibility to pursue a transformative 
goal, regarding fragile states and societies. However, this transformative role 
depends from the capacity of local relevant actors to incorporate processes of 
change exogenously given. Despite the fact regional organizations like the EU, Afri-
can Union and NATO are being influenced by one another (Aris and Wenger, 2014, 
p. 290) the capacity of local-levels (relevant regional and local actors and organiza-
tions) to become embedded in a given process of change, exogenously transmitted, 
is often transformed through a process of ‘norm reframe’, adopted to the extent it 
may be understood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of 
believes and security practices. This condition of embedment in the other’s system 
of norms and values is crucial for a successful implementation of comprehensive 
approach. This is more unlikely to happen in regions and countries affected by the 
consequences of recurrent crisis and intractable violent conflicts, in the context of 
34 Biscop (2016, p. 25) observes that the military option can be used as a preventive instrument to 
escalation and that in ‘a strategy based on pragmatic idealism, can only be an instrument of last 
resort’ and it should become the last resort when ‘vital interests and/or the Responsibility to 
Protect cannot otherwise be upheld’ then Europe should be ready to act.
Isabel Ferreira Nunes
 33 Nação e Defesa
which, ill-defined or multiple interlocutors struggle for power positions, fueling 
violence and instability. Successful comprehensive action encompasses the ‘trans-
ference to’ and ‘adoption by’ of political and strategic culture norms and practices, as 
well as practices of internal coordination and external cooperation, which may be 
foreign to recipient actors35. 
Externally the new EU global approach, as presented at the European Council of 
June 2016, highlights the utility of comprehensive approach, how it may help 
improving the impact of the EU’s external action and a better perception on its 
transformative nature. The EUGS states that ‘Sustainable peace can only be achieved 
through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional 
and international partnerships “(…) A resilient society featuring democracy, trust 
in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state” 
(European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Internally, if the perceptions of power and 
influenced, shared by decision makers and Member States representatives, are con-
formed with such a transformative role, as mentioned earlier, then the EU or CSDP 
are likely to focus on a level of ambition that stresses the normative, preventive, 
holistic and multilateral dimensions of European security, rather than the strategic 
approach of national interest, national security, military gain and unilateral action, 
thus strengthening the very concept of comprehensive approach. 
The EU transformative role, through comprehensive approach is also shaped by the 
presence of Member States own security culture and practices. Friis and Jarmyr 
(2008, p. 10) consider that national interests may obstruct ‘policies and practices at 
both strategic and operational levels’ and so can the presence of distinct secu- 
rity cultures and practices among Member States, leading to disagreements on 
goals, means and ends and ultimately to deficient coordination and cooperation. 
Whenever Member States collectively define common understandings on their 
external level of ambition, this occurs for reasons of collective trust, consensus 
building, operational reliability or dependability of Member States, translated 
into how they select organizations, such as the UN, NATO or the EU/CSDP36 as 
preferred security and strategic partners. As Lehne (2013, p. 16) observes, actors 
commit themselves to “influence international developments in accordance with 
their values and interests”. These choices are guided by an assessment on which of 
35 Italics added by the author.
36 It is important to note that each of these security organizations share different security and 
strategic cultures and employs distinct levels of use of force. Additionally, Member States, due 
to very practical reasons, such as scarcity of resources and elevated costs of maintaining mili-
tary forces exclusively assigned to one security organization, face difficulties in keeping forces 
answerable and ready available to various organizations. Consequently, countries tend to 
assigned similar force packages, if not the same force package to different organizations and to 
give priority to that on which operational reliance is higher in a specific security scenario.
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them better meets current security challenges, whether one refers to the EU in 
Georgia and the Horn of Africa, the UN and EU in Congo, NATO in Afghanistan 
and Libya or France in Mali. This does not mean that Member States are less 
committed to strengthening comprehensive approach, but simply that Member 
States with distinct national interests, different memberships in security organiza-
tions and diverse levels of strategic autonomy or dependency are likely to favour 
the organization or strategic partner37, which is perceived or is better equipped to 
perform successfully on a given security challenge. 
A successful transformative impact means several things to distinct international 
actors. In the EU case it means to hold specific civilian assets for instance: expe- 
rience in rule of law, security sector reform and border control in complex crises; to 
share specific expertise in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of for-
mer combatants; to have specific proficiencies in institutional building and civilian 
administration, in mentoring, advising and monitoring, in development aid and in 
humanitarian relief; or to be able to blend the use of long38 and short term instru-
ments39 that better meet the root causes of instability, crisis and conflicts, without 
resort to force. These civilian niches of expertise can preventively maximize impact 
over recipient countries, enabling the EU to act as a unique security supplier, better 
fitted to implement comprehensive action.
EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review
The current state of research on the implementation of comprehensive approach 
offers various comparative perspectives40 that outline different units and distinct 
levels of analysis. Hauck and Rocca (2014) and Friis and Jarmyr (2008) seem to offer 
the best explanatory approaches to Member States’ implementation of comprehen-
sive approach. Hauck and Rocca (2014, pp. 34-41) identify as main units of analysis 
major EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, The 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, and assesses ‘national agencies and agents’ 
approaches in different levels of analyses of external relations and how they shape 
implementation practices of comprehensive approach. These are then mapped by 
37 Strategic partners tend to cooperate with organizations which political structures resemble best 
their own, especially on what regards decision-making structures.
38 The European Commission shares a strongly embedded culture of economic, financial and 
social incentives regarding development aid culture.
39 CSDP missions and operation in crisis prevention, management and response are set to meet 
immediate security concerns.
40 For a comparative research on selected EU Member States and international organizations, 
namely the EU adaptation to comprehensive approach, see Friis and Jarmyr (2008); Major and 
Schöndorf (2011); Hauck and Rocca (2014), Post (2015) and Merket (2016). For a specific outlook 
on comprehensiveness on defence matters, see Santopinto and Price (2013).
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the authors against variables that may condition foreign policy formulation and 
implementation, such as political and strategic purpose; scope of implementa- 
tion of comprehensive approach as referred in policy documents; degree of interac-
tion among national agencies; degree of institutional formalization of coopera- 
tion; funding method and level of support to the EU comprehensive approach. The 
first variable, formalization of political and strategic purpose regards the roles 
prescribed by state actors, which characterize the values, interests, preferences, 
policies and strategies actors choose to pursue in their external relations, providing 
them a ‘common narrative and a roadmap’ (Gross, 2013, pp. 11-16) for foreign 
policy during crisis. The second variable refers to the scope of comprehensive 
approach, whether actors choose a system wide approach (including systemic 
approach that binds diplomacy, security, crisis management, humanitarian relief, 
development aid, rule of law, business and trade cooperation); a medium range 
approach (diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action and devel-
opment) or a narrow approach (limited to civil-military coordination). The third 
variable found in literature regards the degree of interaction among national agen-
cies, as a pre-condition for comprehensiveness. Interaction (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, 
p. 34) may range from a low level characterized by simple information share, to 
a medium level where information is shared and some activities are coordinated 
and a high level of integration41, where policy formulation and coordination occurs 
and is corroborated in policy documents, joint programming, implementing and 
monitoring. The fourth variable pertains to institutional formalization of coope- 
ration indicating the cases where actors engage in ‘ad hoc cooperation’, ‘flexible 
arrangements’ or highly formalized initiatives characterized by ‘standardization 
and predictability’ (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 34) in the context of an agreed 
institutional framework. These choices are themselves conditioned by functional 
dependency among actors at the strategic and operational levels and by percep-
tions on institutions organizational efficiency. This means that an actor can be per-
ceived as efficient according to the size and power of its military capabilities used 
is crisis management or in function of specific proficiencies in stabilization, recon-
struction, capacity building, developmental and humanitarian instruments (Nunes, 
2016). 
41 The UK’s Stabilisation Unit offers a useful definition to ‘Integrated Approach’ (as promoted by 
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) referring to ‘people from different institutions 
(with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several 
levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government 
Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation con-
text and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Govern-
ment Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing (United Kingdom Minis-
try of Defence, 2014). 
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Being comprehensive approach a joint effort among different internal and external 
actors, it entails different security and strategic cultures, varied interpretations on 
the ‘rule of force’ and the ‘force of rules’, distinct levels of political and operational 
trust relaying on diverse degrees of interdependence and functional dependency 
from a dominant power, an alliance or other multilateral security institutions. Such 
dependencies affect the very concept of comprehensiveness, how it is implemented 
and which strategic partners are more likely to guarantee successful comprehen-
sive action. This set of conditions is closely related to institutional formalization, 
addressed in the study conducted by Hauck and Rocca (2014) and concerns the 
national and international orientation of actors. This will predispose them, in par-
ticular state actors, to implement ‘comprehensive approach beyond the national 
institutional set-up’ leading them to divide external tasks by cooperating bilaterally 
with other EU Member States, collectively with alliances, multilaterally with orga-
nizations and with other local actors. The fifth variable identified in literature is 
funding, combining the possibility to manage dedicated funds to the military, 
diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian dimensions in an integrated manner, 
allowing assessing how much pooled funding is dedicated to fragility and conflict 
affected states and societies through crisis management, recovery (including 
resilience), development and stabilization programs and projects. 
Drawing on a comparative review of the work of Hauck and Rocca (2014), Friis and 
Jarmyr (2008), Major and Shöndorf (2011), Post (2015) and Santopinto and Price 
(2013) one can observe the following findings. The countries which have global 
foreign policy goals, that are internationally more active, strategically abler and 
that often issue formal policy guidelines under the form of strategic documents 
(United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), that establish formal 
coordination and cooperation between national governments and agents, are 
among the ones that have been implementing comprehensive approach in a more 
efficient way. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France and Denmark are 
among the ones with the most developed institutional and processual settings to 
accommodate comprehensive approach. 
The four countries, which are in the forefront of implementation of comprehen- 
sive approach, appear to share similar attitudes towards comprehensive approach. 
The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and France with global foreign 
interests, have opted for strategic and targeted approaches to implementation of 
comprehensive approach with the involvement of relevant national actors, with 
responsibility for external action. Consequently, this suggests that guided and 
inclusive approaches to internal coordination and external cooperation facilitate 
effective implementation. Motives to engage in comprehensive approach range 
from ‘national security reasons’, growing ‘power decline’ (Post, 2015, p. 370) and 
‘operational benefits’(Idem, p. 340) in the British case, to anchor comprehensive 
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approach to a national strategic concept in the Danish case and to engagement in 
comprehensive approach for reasons of ‘national economic interests’ (Hauck and 
Rocca, 2014, p. 39; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 1 and p. 3), as in the 
Dutch case. Denmark being the major donor in development programmes, practi- 
ces comprehensive approach as a way to implement development aid and develop 
peacekeeping missions (Rosgaard, 2008). France employs comprehensive approach 
as an instrument to bridge its own national security and development policies. 
Among these Member States, authoritative documents support comprehensive 
approach such as the ‘National Security Strategy’ (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 
2008; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010) in the case of the UK; the 
‘Guideline on the Integrated Approach’ and the ‘International Security Strategy’ in 
the Dutch case42; and the ‘Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, 2013’ and 
the ‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013’. These documents, 
inform national visions on international affairs, define foreign policy goals, 
streamline decision-making and cross-sectoral internal coordination and external 
cooperation. 
In the face of current threats and risks diplomacy, development, defense, trade, 
health and justice policies are closely connected and institutional adaptation 
determines external action, whether one refers to the British and Danish ‘whole of 
government approach’ or the Dutch and French ‘integrated approach’ (Hauck and 
Rocca, 2014, pp. 35-36 and pp. 38-39); Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Den-
mark et al., 2013). In the four cases the national agency(ies) leading the process of 
formulation and implementation of comprehensive approach take the form of joint 
leadership, gathering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Netherlands, France and 
Denmark), plus Overseas (UK)43, Defence (in all the cases) and ministerial develop-
ment agencies, plus the Ministry of Justice in the Dutch case. In the Dutch and 
Danish cases non-governmental and private sectors play a significant role (Hauck 
and Rocca, 2014, p. 48).
42 See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). In 2013, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Frans Timmermans addressed a letter to the President of the House of Representatives on 
‘International Security Strategy’ suggesting that integrated approach would only succeed if 
actors engage in the deployment of integrated instruments such as ‘diplomacy, development 
cooperation, defence, the police, the justice system and trade’. See Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs DVB/VD-073/2013 and Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014.
43 In the case of the United Kingdom, the inter-policy approach adopted led to the creation of 
an inter-agency unit first named ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit’ and later ‘Stabilization 
Unit’, which gathers representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Ministry and the 
Department for International Development Managed with a joint funding pool. Similarly, the 
United States settled an ‘Office for the Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization’ (Friis 
and Jarmyr, 2014, p. 4).
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The UK, Denmark and The Netherlands allocate dedicated funds to the implemen-
tation of comprehensive approach (Hauck and Rocca, 2014) facilitating the aggre-
gation and sharing of financial, human resources and expertise, thus creating 
a solid material support base for comprehensive action44. France has no shared 
funding, although representatives of the Ministry of Finance attend inter-ministe-
rial meetings (Idem, p. 36) gathering Defence, Foreign Affairs and the French 
Development Agency.
Another set of countries, such as Germany and Sweden reveal distinct case studies. 
Although internationally active and committed, both countries hold reservations 
regarding the use of military force in external relations. In the first case, the motive 
to engage in comprehensive approach pertains to a manifestation of military com-
mitment (Post, 2015, p. 370) by other means and a source of legitimacy (Idem, 
p. 390). In the Swedish case, it is a way to enforce norms and principles and pro-
mote ‘international development cooperation’ (Post, 2015, p. 371) reflecting an 
international ambition to export its own ‘crisis management norms’ (Idem, pp. 355 
and p. 390), with a specific interest on prevention. Both privilege the use of preven-
tive, civilian and soft power instruments, a trend which is gaining visibility among 
the EU official regional positions for fragile states and societies45.
Formal strategic initiatives guide comprehensive approach, in the German case the 
Action Plan on 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding’ (2004)46 and ‘White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future 
of the Bundeswehr’ (2016)47. In the Swedish case, a ‘Total Defence’ concept (Post, 
2015, p. 324) employed to deal with ‘civil-military action’ guides comprehensive 
approach and action. 
Institutional adaptation takes the form of a German Inter-Ministerial Steering 
Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention design to steer the interministerial external 
dimension of policies and international cooperation in support of the implemen-
tation of ‘networked security’. In the Swedish case a dedicated agency, super-
vised by the Ministry of Defence, coordinates non-military actors and Stockholm 
44 For instance, the UK common funding to the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, under the 
authority of the National Security Council, announced in June 2013 for former Yugoslavia, was 
of £1 billion combining defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence), 
see International Security Information Service (2014, ft.1, p. 4). In Denmark, a Fund for Peace 
and Stability was also established.
45 Council of the European Union (2011) 16858/11; Council of the European Union 2014/7671 and 
European Union External Action Service (2011).
46 The Action Plan defines crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral task at both government and civil 
society level and identifies the respective national structures involved. See German Federal 
Government, 2004 [accessed on 12nd April 2016].
47 German Ministry of Defence (2006). See also Major and Schöndorf (2011, p. 3).
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has been a strong supporter of a ‘European level conflict prevention approach’ 
(Hauck and Rocca, 2013, p. 38). This preference is a structural feature of Swedish 
foreign policy, leading it to present an ‘Action Plan Preventing Violent Conflicts’, 
which was endorsed in 1999 by Member States (Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009).
The document acknowledges the role of different actors and according to Post 
(2015, p. 327) led to the organization of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a 
way that would strengthened cross sectoral coordination in conflict prevention. 
Later in 2001, during the Swedish EU Presidency, the adoption of the EU Pro-
gramme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, during the Gothenburg Council, 
led to a European valorization of the civilian instruments in crisis management and 
to the creation of the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. On 
what concerns the leading agencies for comprehensive approach, Germany’s net-
work security structure, present in its interministerial organization, fragmentizes 
decision making and does not lead to obvious institutional adaptation, being coor-
dination conducted on an ad hoc basis using ‘various conceptual approaches, 
present among relevant actors, without pre-settled mechanism for joint analysis, 
development and implementation’ (Major and Schöndorf, 2011, p. 3) of crisis man-
agement policies. This occurs despite the fact a Federal Government Representative 
is responsible for connecting ministerial departments to the higher ranks of politi-
cal decision-making (Idem, p. 3). In the Swedish case, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs provides considerable input to Sweden’s involvement in international con-
flict management, while an agency responsible for non-military actors working in 
conflict situations and natural disasters relief is coordinated by the Ministry of 
Defence (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 36). In both cases, national leading agencies 
pursue a much less structured coordinated action, when compared with the first 
group of countries, showing preference for a more plural and network centric coor-
dination among civil-military, developmental and humanitarian actors. 
On strategic preferences and strategic partners, Germany and Sweden show pre- 
ference for ‘leading from behind’ actively contributing to the domains of develop-
ment and humanitarian action. While Germany has been more reluctant to engage 
directly in military action, it has been very active in post conflict situations, per- 
ceiving comprehensive approach as a way to compensate its less visible military 
commitment in international missions. To Berlin, a UN mandate is a requisite for 
external action and the EU is recognized as a preferred partner for civilian crisis 
management, post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian action, furthering 
European integration. Sweden focuses its preferences on those partners who can 
promote its policy goals regarding ‘international development cooperation’ (Post, 
2015, p. 371). While the UN can provide the necessary legal and legitimate back-
ground to multilateral external action. The EU can make available financial instru-
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ments and make use of Germany’s expertise on developmental programmes and 
policies, as well as on humanitarian action.
On the application of financial resources regarding fragility situations, none of the 
two countries has shared or dedicated funding sources.
The last variable pertains to collective agency or how Member States internally 
translated collective will into implementation of comprehensive approach is indi-
rectly addressed by the literature reviewed. The external level where collective 
agency of comprehensive approach is reproduced, is also different across the coun-
tries studied, denoting distinct worldviews and expressions of strategic preference 
in the way foreign, security policy and external cooperation are conducted. Strate-
gic preference is conditioned by political and operational trust and by perceptions 
of common interests, common threat and shared opportunities. This results in 
selective commitment of states, in function of the level of institutional integration 
among international organizations (NATO, EU or United Nations).48 Those with 
preferential relations with the United States and NATO, that are more likely to 
make use of force, notably in its military dimension and are already engaged in 
long term missions and operations, in the follow up of which comprehensive action 
may be applied, tend to opt for the implementation of comprehensiveness, bilater-
ally, with one international organization or under the format of a coalition of the 
willing. For those actors that privileged a strong legal base, on which to ground 
external action for reasons of legitimacy, legality, acceptance and representa- 
tiveness, international players, such as the United Nations and the EU offer the 
preferential institutional platform, through or with which to implement compre-
hensive action. 
The study conducted by Friis and Jarmyr (2008) on implementation of comprehen-
sive approach isolates three alternative analytical categories distinct from previous 
studies: whole of government approach; inter-agency level of collaboration and 
intra-agency initiatives, testing them in terms of efficiency, consistency, ability to 
respond to insecurity, to set up policies and to add legitimacy to external action 
(Idem, p. 4). Major and Shöndorf (2011) complement these contributes by address-
ing how views and practices are observed among Member States (United King-
dom, France and Germany) (Idem, pp. 2-4) and how actors (inter-ministerial agen-
cies) responsible for international coordination (Idem, pp. 4-6) adopt comprehensive 
approach in order to attain a more effective external cooperation with the EU, 
NATO or the UN. Svenja Post (2015) on the one hand, centers her research on the 
national institutional set up of Member States, how this affects the competences 
boundary divide among national actors and addresses how this applies to interac-
48 See North Atlantic Council (2006); United States State Department (2013) and High Represen-
tative and the European Commission, JOIN(2013)30 final.
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tion with collective security actors. Post (2015, p. 379) considers that “approaches 
differ in accordance with the particular administrative-political framework and 
crisis management context, in which the respective institution or government 
operates”. This author also underlines the role played by national interests and 
preferences and how they inform Member States positions within the EU. Post con-
siders that the implementation of comprehensive approach by state actors relates 
closely to how far the development and conceptualization, adopted by interna-
tional organizations, is perceived “as to be compatible with their own crisis man-
agement background and needs” (Idem, p. 372). This leads to conclude that the 
utility of comprehensive approach to Member States’ foreign policies is evaluated 
through the lenses of national preferences. Consequently, individual actors are 
likely to pursue their own objectives, leaving comprehensive approach exposed to 
inter-institutional rivalries and different ‘institutional weights’ of national actors in 
the international stage. This observation is valid, both to explain the behaviour of 
Member States and EU institutions, such as the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), towards implementation of comprehensive approach. At this level, it 
appears that acceptance of ‘a power base’ and presence of a ‘clear authority posi-
tion’, as related to other actors, are defining conditions to the implementation of 
comprehensive approach (Post, 2015, p. 380). 
Still in the context of how comprehensive approach is reproduced in collective 
agency, strategic partnerships are also important instruments of external coopera-
tion between the EU and other international actors. These foreign policy instru-
ments correspond to a notion of international cooperation in a loosen format able to 
mobilize ways to address global and regional issues, where comprehensive solu-
tions matter. In the context of EU’s strategic partnerships, the domains of crisis 
management, capability development and political consultations are the most 
important dimensions of cooperation. Cooperation between the EU and the United 
Nations (UN)49 is the most institutionalized and old cooperative relation and both 
organizations share similar goals and methods of cooperation. The UN is one of the 
organizations with the longest experience on comprehensive approach and action, 
through its integrated missions, meant to overcome the limitations of traditional 
peacekeeping in order to adapt to new forms of total war or intractable crises and 
conflicts by introducing a ‘mission approached holistic or full service operations’50. 
A few aspects may limit cooperation for instance the presence of too many actors 
involved in the process of implementation of comprehensive approach, competi-
tion between EU bodies such as the European Commission (DEVCO) and those of 
the United Nations (UN Development Programme; United Nations Conference on 
49 See Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2004); Tardy (2011) and Cîrlig (2015).
50 See Weir (2006); Harmer (2008) and Rubinstein et al. (2008).
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Trade and Development and United Nations Human Settlements Programme). The 
UN is often considered an ineffective actor, with a low record of implementation 
and limited international representation of collective interest, conditioned by the 
veto system among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, which may impact negatively on cooperation. The positive side of cooperation 
lies on the fact the UN and the EU are able to balance each other through comple-
mentary resources, made available according to similar normative frames and 
values. Since early 2000, both organizations formally shared analogous perspec-
tives on global threats (United Nations, 2004). The UN strengthens legitimacy of 
comprehensive action through its mandate and scope of representativeness, while 
the EU through the Commissions’ programmes and projects can place its financial 
weigh in implementing comprehensive approach (Gowan, 2014, p. 277).
Cooperation between the EU and NATO may further the implementation of 
comprehensive approach, as long as one understands that NATO and CSDP have 
different security identities and purposes, which does not mean that interests and 
actions cannot be shared51. The EU through CSDP is better equipped to engage in 
preventive action using reconciliatory strategies that connect security, development 
and governance. The combination of CSDP crisis management tools and the Com-
mission’s Foreign Policy Instruments enable it to take the lead on non-military 
emergency operations, linking actions in crisis management with those of develop-
ment aid and humanitarian relief. 
On the other hand, NATO as a defence organization based on strategic dependence 
among allies, centred on strategic supremacy of a superpower and that of strategi-
cally more capable allies, has higher strategic leverage due to the military weigh at 
its disposal. It is perceived as more efficient due to the size, deployability, impact of 
its capabilities and collective nature of its defence identity, which works as a mutu-
ally reinforcing driving force among allies. NATO’s cooperative initiatives towards 
comprehensive approach in the domain of crisis management and conflict resolu-
tion cannot succeed without the bilateral support of allies, of the EU Member States 
and UN focus on stabilization, reconstruction, development and humanitarian 
aid. During the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO endorsed a ‘Comprehensive Political 
Guidance’ stating that while “NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities 
strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking 
into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisa-
tions and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate 
more effectively in planning and conducting operations” (North Atlantic Council, 
51 This part of the study draws on the findings presented by Nunes (2016) at the ‘EU Strategic 
Partnerships EU-NATO Relations’ at the international seminar ‘The European Union Global 
Strategy’.
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2006, §7). Better cooperation between the EU and NATO on comprehensive 
approach, in particular regarding civil-military dimension, requires better plan-
ning, command options and capabilities for CSDP missions, depending from those 
Member States strategically more able and capable. Enhanced European command 
options for CSDP operations, through the EU planning cell for CDSP operations 
within SHAPE, in close connection with the EU Military staff for military opera-
tions, are already a reality. This capability can be supported by the existing five 
headquarters offered by the UK, France, Italy, Greece and Germany, under the 
Union’s implementation of a ‘framework nation’ concept, as foreseen in the Lisbon 
Treaty, through which leading nations may offer particular capabilities.
This partnership contains some limitations that result from a prevailing notion 
that effective strategic partners are only possible among equals, that share a grand 
strategy and integrated approaches to security and defence policy at the concep-
tual, doctrinal and operational level and very precise strategic definitions and 
approaches on why, where and how to act. The cases referred earlier show that 
among and within Member States, this is often the case. A more contested, con-
nected and complex world, as the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) 
suggests, requires strategic approaches to security partnerships, able to meet the 
diversity of challenges in a tailored made and flexible manner, adaptable to emer-
gent security and defence challenges and risks, leading to better European coordi-
nation and external cooperation with the Alliance. For the moment, CSDP and 
development cooperation should focus on what they do best that is, to develop 
non-exclusively military emergency missions and operations. While NATO should 
focus on military dissuasive and reactive action, towards high intensity military 
contingencies, without meaning that Europe, in the medium term, should not be 
able to act at the high end of the military operational spectrum. The EUGS, given 
that one of the focus of the document is partnerships, could have also contributed 
to help reassessing functional cooperation between CSDP and NATO, underlining 
their complementary strategic purposes and their specific contribution to regional 
and international security. This is a difficult task, considering that NATO and the 
EU comprise states with distinct strategic cultures and outlooks, which affect the 
comprehensiveness of the agendas of security organizations, the very concept of 
strategic partnership and the choice of preferred strategic partners, whether one 
refers to the EU/CSDP or NATO.
A full implementation of comprehensive approach may also depend from a suc-
cessful accomplishment of EU missions and operations in the higher spectrum of 
security and defence. With this in mind, a new way should be paved to solve the 
problem of access to NATO’s command, control and planning capabilities by CSDP 
operations, under the Berlin Plus agreement. This could be done, whether by intro-
ducing an ‘opt-out clause’ option, for those NATO allies and European Member 
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States that often block the use of this mechanism, therefore abstaining without 
impairing access to those capabilities by the EU, as a part or a whole. On capabili-
ties, the European Defence Agency has identified deficits, which a better and ratio-
nal cooperation with NATO and the US could help overcoming, namely on what 
concerns strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, surveillance and reconnaissance. In 
the future, the possibility to develop a ‘Berlin Plus Reversed’ agreement through 
which, the development of EU civilian capabilities could be made available to other 
organizations in crisis management and post conflict reconstruction, would also 
further the EU international role in comprehensive approach.
A clearer position of the US administration on European defence would also be 
welcomed. This would facilitate the building of coalitions of the willing, under 
a NATO-EU partnership flag and the strengthening of commitment regarding 
Permanent Structure Cooperation among like-minded and strategically capable 
EU partners, without unnecessary overstretch of capabilities. A strong compre-
hensive transatlantic security agenda implies that information and knowledge on 
strategic affairs should be shared, that cooperation among those who can and 
will, does result in added value to prevention, crisis management and conflict 
resolution and that coordination and cooperation occurs among those that can 
offer the best and most sustainable solutions to local, regional and international 
security problems.
Conclusion
Comprehensive approach does not correspond to a new, but rather an adaptive 
response of state and non-state actors to international security challenges. The com-
plexity of current challenges to international security requires better internal coor-
dination, stronger external cooperation and more committed participation of local 
relevant actors.
On the concept of comprehensive approach, one may acknowledge that there is a 
general agreement on its broad conceptual delimitation on what it is and what it 
does, although the volatility of current international security and stability makes 
it difficult to generate an all-inclusive concept and practice. On what it is, it is 
generally described in academic literature and in organizations’ policy documents 
as a process hold by different stakeholders, intended to prevent, mitigate, manage 
and solve crises and conflicts, at different stages of fragility of states and societies. 
As for what it does, it impacts within state and non-state actors’ policies and orga-
nizational structures and it predisposes them to cross-sectoral administrative 
and managerial adaptation or reform of the external dimension of policies, for 
which they are responsible for. It also has consequences over the stability and future 
development of recipient countries of missions, operations and development 
projects and programmes.
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Theoretically, comprehensive approach offers a challenging field of research on: 
institutional and organizational adaptation to the current security environment; 
new conceptualization of security practice; possibility to solve the security dilem-
mas through comprehensive approach as a transformative project; norm/practices 
incorporation and security governance; comprehensive approach as a cause of 
institutional reform and institutional reform as a consequence of implementation of 
comprehensive approach; comprehensive approach as a way to enhance resilience 
to fragility of states and societies; new securitisation of coordination, of EU bodies, 
policies and cooperation practices among strategic partners. At the empirical level, 
comprehensive approach suggests interesting outlooks on foreign policy and 
national interests; addresses prevention and sustainability as mitigating elements 
of insecurity and contributes to a better understanding of crises and conflicts cycles.
The second part of the study identified the various challenges that comprehensive 
approach entails and that mirror the current security environment. The first regards 
the successful ability to ensure transition across the various phases of crises and 
conflicts, from preventive action to peace and sustainable development. The second 
concerns ownership and the possibility to strengthened local actors and institu-
tions, helping them to become more resilient and committed to stabilization, recon-
struction and sustainable development. The third pertains to complementarity of 
instruments from CSDP missions and operations, to the programmes and projects 
of the European Commission, to bilateral and multilateral commitments of Mem-
ber States in the organizations present in theatre. The fourth, results from the diver-
sity of actors that take part in crisis and conflicts, which may make consensus more 
difficult to reach, legitimacy harder to attain and efficiency more complex to achieve 
due to the presence of various interlocutors. These are often perceived by security 
providers as authoritative and representative of states and communities’ interests, 
sharing different collaborative practices or having no previous collaborative tradi-
tion. Diversity also increases competition among actors hampering a positive coop-
eration. The last challenge identified in the study respects to timing and sustain-
ability of solutions to crises, considering that different policy and security 
instruments (e.g. foreign policy, crisis management, financial support and develop-
ment aid) require different times associated to long term/short term presences and 
support in theatre. 
On the third section of the article, the definition of a EU level of ambition that 
includes a more comprehensive role for the EU was addressed, examining how it 
affects how actors think, what is relevant and what is prioritary. Current security 
challenges, from security governance to energy and food sustainability, claim alter-
native ways to project influence and generate impact other than military power. 
Recent crises such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria prove that the military 
instrument is one among many contributing to a more secure environment. Com-
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prehensive approach suggests a transformative project, which success depends 
from the ability of local actors to adopt changes exogenously given. Norm incorpo-
ration by local relevant actors is a transformative effect with consequences over 
providers/donors and its accomplishment a sign of positive impact of comprehen-
sive approach among recipients. This condition occurs when norms are under-
stood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of beliefs and 
security practices. It involves a process of norm transference and norm adoption 
and implementation from the security governance level to sustainable develop-
ment practices. This transformative intension is also conditioned by how security 
cultures and practices may affect effective coordination and external cooperation 
with partners and local actors, when norms and procedures are incorporated lead-
ing to agreements on goals, means and ends at the strategic and operational level.
In the final section of this study, aspects of implementation at the national and col-
lective level were chosen from academic and policy oriented literature, with the 
support of policy documents, in order to assess which units and levels of analysis 
are selected to explain the implementation of comprehensive approach. The units 
of analysis found in literature are all internationally active EU Member States in the 
security, defense, foreign policy, trade, developmental and humanitarian dimen-
sions of external relations. All share an external behaviour anchored to global, tar-
geted and structural foreign policies sustained in reasons of national interest, con-
verted into formal policy guidelines. This leads to conclude that comprehensive 
approach is not, in most of the cases, free of self-help motives, but rather a foreign 
policy instrument of national interest. 
The levels of analysis considered to assess implementation of comprehensive 
approach regard those expressed by political and strategical goals stated in politi-
cal-strategical documents; on the degree of interaction among national agencies; 
formalization of institutional cooperation and shared financing methods. These 
determine the way comprehensive action is developed bilaterally, collectively or 
multilaterally. Comprehensive approach is adopted by the majority of actors as a 
way to strengthened states’ position in international affairs, to safeguard economic 
priorities, to bind different national policies interests or to reinforce cooperation 
with partners that may further Member States international peacekeeping commit-
ments and development aid programmes. The degree of interaction, as expressed 
in literature, ranges from close coordination among all external dimensions of 
public policies, to the traditional civil-military cooperation, with various levels of 
information exchange and joint action. Institutional formalization of cooperation in 
comprehensive approach varies from contingent and unilateral to collective, when-
ever political, strategic and operational trust facilitates cooperation among strategic 
partners. In most cases, literature show that the leading national agency for 
comprehensive approach is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the 
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Ministries of Defence, Trade, Justice and agencies responsible for development 
cooperation. Dedicated lines of financing are only present in two cases that of the 
United Kingdom and Denmark.
The collective expression of comprehensive approach resonates actors’ preferred 
strategic partnerships, through which distinct strategic outlooks inform different 
practices of comprehensive approach. This situation affects the very understanding 
of comprehensiveness of security agendas, including different perceptions of threat, 
risk and the use of force across allies, which shape the choice of preferred strategic 
partner (United Nations, EU or NATO). Member States, such as the United King-
dom and France, which are strategically more capable, are likely to engage in com-
prehensive action with other like-minded partners (NATO), whenever it empowers 
the global impact of their interests. Germany as a normative power strategically 
focused, makes the military dimension of comprehensive action dependent from a 
UN mandate. To The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden with a good record of 
international engagement and an extensive international cooperative practice, 
comprehensive action is a way to strengthen their international role and comple-
ment policy initiatives and programmes in terms of foreign, security and defence 
policies within NATO and the EU. 
The last decade has been a formative experience on comprehensive approach to the 
European Union, to Member States and partners due to the transnational and cross- 
sectoral impact of current challenges and the means required to meet them. Better 
cooperation and coordination have become main conditions for successful compre-
hensive action. Comprehensiveness will only work effectively, if security providers 
and beneficiaries contribute to create states and communities that are more resil-
ient, willing and able to contribute to their own security and development, while 
advancing a more efficient cooperative security with international and regional 
organizations, meant to enhance ownership. Similarly, the choice of external part-
ners to further comprehensive action should follow a benchmark approach led by 
consistent political solidarity, targeted and efficient cooperation and long term sus-
tainable solutions during and after crisis and conflicts occur.
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